Is a Surrogate a Mother?
By Michelle Goldberg | Slate | Feb. 15, 2016
“Surrogacy’s been distinguished as something completely different from adoption,” says Lisa Ikemoto, a UC Davis School of Law professor who specializes in reproductive rights and bioethics. Unlike in adoption, there’s no legally required screening of intended parents. A pregnant woman who offers to give her baby up for adoption can reconsider her decision; in California, a pregnant surrogate cannot. To a large extent, the law “puts a lot of trust in a surrogacy center to make sure that these things are carried out appropriately,” Ikemoto says. “It’s very industry-friendly, and by ‘industry,’ I’m referring to the fertility industry.”
This article provides an overview of the Melissa Cook case — the story of a 47-year old woman in California who agreed to become a gestational mother and the “battle” that followed, between her and the intended parent, once she became pregnant with triplets.
Though based in the United States, a number of issues that emerged in the case have also been documented in international commercial surrogacy arrangements. This includes legal concerns related to contracts and their enforcement, practices that can impact the health of gestational mothers (such as reductions), and implications on the children that are born.
For those interested, the article also provides a lot of useful information on the 1986 Baby M case — the first contested surrogacy case in American history. Read the full article >
Published in the first quarter of 2016, this report tracks clinics providing surrogacy services in the United States (208), as well as the number of surrogacy cases in each clinic. It records approximately 900 cycles of IVF using gestational surrogacy in 2014. The data is approximate – and the report explains why – and will have changed since the date of publication. However, it is still a useful resource for anyone looking for a list of clinics across the country.
This article challenges “leftists” (individuals with liberal or progressive political and social views) to oppose commercial surrogacy, arguing that the practice flies in the face of two of their most enduring principles: autonomy and equality. It draws a parallel between a sweatshop worker and a gestational mother, both of whom sign contracts out of “economic desperation.” It suggests that such contracts would be deemed “immoral” by “progressives” and, for equality to exist, it is the government’s role (and not that of the contracting parties) to ensure agreements are unenforceable.
